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We examine the applicability of wireless indoor quantum key distribution (QKD) in hybrid quantum-classical
networks. We propose practical configurations that would enable wireless access to such networks. The proposed
setups would allow an indoor wireless user, equipped with a QKD-enabled mobile device, to communicate se-
curely with a remote party on the other end of the access network. QKD signals, sent through wireless indoor
channels, are combined with classical ones and sent over shared fiber links to the remote user. Dense wavelength-
division multiplexing would enable the simultaneous transmission of quantum and classical signals over the same
fiber. We consider the adverse effects of the background noise induced by Raman-scattered light on the QKD
receivers due to such an integration. In addition, we consider the loss and the background noise that arise from
indoor environments. We consider a number of discrete and continuous-variable QKD protocols and study their
performance in different scenarios.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Future communications networks must offer improved security
features against possible attacks enabled by quantum computing
technologies. One possible solution is to develop quantum-
classical networks that allow any two users to not only exchange
data, but also share secret key bits using quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) techniques. Such a key can then be used to enable
secure transmission of data between the two users. QKD tech-
nology is commercially available today [1,2], and it has been
used to exchange secret keys between pairs of users connected
via fiber [3] or free-space [4] channels. QKD has also been
implemented in several network settings [5–7]. Despite this
progress, more work needs to be done to make QKD conven-
iently available to the end users of communications networks.
In this paper, we address wireless access to a hybrid quantum-
classical network. We consider hybrid links, with or without a
trusted/untrusted relay point, between a wireless end user and
the corresponding central office in an access network. This is
done by adopting wireless indoor QKD links and embedding
them into fiber-based passive optical networks (PONs).
QKD enables two remote users, Alice and Bob, to generate
and exchange provably secure keys guaranteed by the laws of
quantum physics [8,9]. The obtained secret keys can then be
used for data encryption and decryption between the two
intended users. In conventional QKD protocols, an eavesdrop-
per, Eve, cannot intercept the key without disturbing the system,
and accordingly having her presence discovered. Furthermore,
because of the no-cloning theorem [10], Eve cannot exactly
copy unknown quantum states. Based on these two principles,
Bennett and Brassard in 1984 came up with their BB84 protocol
in which single photons were carrying the key-bit information
from Alice to Bob [11]. Over time, more practical protocols have
been developed that allow us to use weak laser pulses instead
of ideal single-photon sources [12]. Nevertheless, most QKD
protocols will still rely on the few-photon regime of operation,
which makes them vulnerable to loss and background noise.
This will make the implementation of QKD especially challeng-
ing in wireless mobile environments in which background noise
is strong and alignment options are limited [13,14].
However challenging, embedding QKD capability into
mobile/handheld devices is an attractive solution for exchang-
ing sensitive data in a safe and convenient manner. For
instance, customers in a bank can exchange secret keys wire-
lessly with access points in the branch without waiting for a
teller or a cash machine. Initial prototypes have already been
made that enable a handheld device to exchange secret keys
with an ATM without being affected by skimming frauds
[15,16]. As another application, it would be desirable to enable
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a user working in a public space, such as an airport or a cafe, to
exchange secret keys with its service provider via possibly un-
trusted nodes. Similarly, once fiber-to-the-home infrastructure
is widely available, home users should benefit from such wire-
less links that connect them, via a PON, to other service-
provider nodes. In this case, the connection to the PON
can be via an internal QKD node trusted by the user. Note
that, in all cases above, we are dealing with a wireless link
in an indoor environment, which may offer certain advantages,
as compared to a general outdoor setup, in terms of ease of
implementation. It is then a proper starting point for offering
wireless QKD services as we study in this paper.
The above scenarios require hybrid links on which both data
and quantum signals can travel in both wireless and wired
modes. In this case, wireless QKD signals must somehow be
collected and sent to the nearest service-provider node over
an optical fiber. In order to have a cost-effective solution,
the collected wireless QKD signals should be transmitted along
with classical data signals over the same fiber links. A QKD
system run on such a hybrid quantum-classical link would then
face certain challenges. First, the background light in the wire-
less environment can sneak into the fiber system and increase
the error rates of the QKD setup. Furthermore, due to non-
linear effects in optical fibers such as four-wave mixing and
Raman scattering [17], the data channels that travel alongside
QKD channels on the same fiber can induce additional back-
ground noise on QKD systems. In particular, the impact of the
Raman-scattered light can be severe [17], because its spectrum
can overlap with the frequency band of QKD channels. By
using extensive filtering in time and frequency domains, the
impact of this noise can be mitigated [3,18,19] and even
maximally reduced [20], but it cannot be fully suppressed.
In this paper, by considering the effect of various sources of
noise mentioned above, four setups for embedding wireless
indoor QKD links into quantum-classical access networks
are investigated. In each case, we find the corresponding
key generation rate for relevant QKD protocols. We use the
decoy-state BB84 (DS-BB84) [12], which relies on weak laser
pulses, and measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-
QKD) [21] protocols in our setups. The latter protocol can
provide a trust-free link, as required in the case of a user in
a public space, between the wireless user and the central office
in an access network. The price to pay, however, is a possible
reduction in the rate. We also consider the GG02 protocol
[22], as a continuous-variable (CV) QKD scheme, and com-
pare it with our discrete-variable (DV) protocols in terms of
resilience to background noise and loss [23,24]. CV QKD
receivers require standard telecommunications technology for
coherent detection, and in that sense they do not rely on
single-photon detectors as their DV counterparts do.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, the system is described, and in Section 3 the key-
rate analysis is presented. The numerical results are discussed
in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe our proposed setups for hybrid
quantum-classical access networks comprised of optical wireless
and fiber-optic links. Such setups can wirelessly connect a
mobile user, in indoor environments, to the central office
in access networks; see Fig. 1. We assume a total of N end
users, which are connected to the central office via a dense
wavelength-division multiplexing (DWDM) PON. The corre-
sponding wavelengths assigned to quantum and classical data
channels are, respectively, denoted by Q  fλq1 ; λq2 ;…; λqN g
and D  fλd 1 ; λd 2 ;…; λdN g. The kth user, k  1;…; N , em-
ploys wavelength λqk (λdk ) to communicate his/her quantum
(classical) signals to the central office, as shown in Fig. 1.
The same wavelengths are also used for the downlink. In order
to heuristically reduce the Raman noise effect, we assume
that the lower wavelength grid is allocated to the QKD chan-
nels, while the upper grid is assigned to data channels [19].
In principle, one can optimize the wavelength allocation such
that the Raman noise on the quantum channels is mini-
mized [25].
For our wireless user, we consider a particular indoor envi-
ronment, in which it has been shown that wireless QKD is fea-
sible [13,14]. In this setting, a windowless room of X × Y × Z
dimensions is lit by an artificial light source. The possibly mo-
bile QKD transmitter is placed on the floor, and it transmits
light toward the ceiling. The transmitter module may or may
not be equipped with beam-steering tools. In the former case,
we assume that a minimal manual alignment is in place, by
which the QKD source is facing the ceiling. This can be
achieved by providing some instructions for the end user during
the QKD protocol. The QKD receiver or the signal collector is
fixed at the center of the room’s ceiling; see Fig. 1. We assume
that, by using some dynamic beam steering, maximum possible
power is collected from the QKD source. This may be achieved
by using additional beacon pulses. The collected light may
go through a non-imaging optical concentrator, such as a
compound parabolic collector, and then be filtered by a band-
pass filter before being detected or sent out toward its final
destination.
In each setup, we particularly study three different cases re-
garding the position of the mobile QKD device. Case 1 refers to
the scenario when the QKD transmitter is placed at the center
of the room’s floor and emits light upward with semi-angle at
half power of Φ1∕2. In case 2, the same QKD transmitter as in
Fig. 1. Schematic view of exchanging secret keys between an indoor
wireless user with a central office at the end of an access network. The
transmitter is mobile, while the QKD receiver or the collection point is
fixed on the ceiling.
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case 1 is moved to a corner of the room in order to assess the
mobility features. These cases will represent the best- and the
worst-case scenarios in terms of channel loss, when minimal
beam alignment is used at the transmitter end. In case 3,
the light beam at the QKD source is narrowed and is directed
toward the QKD receiver or the coupling element. This would
correspond to the worst-case scenario when beam alignment is
available at both the source and the receiver. In all cases, we
assume a static channel in our analysis, that is, we assume that
the channel does not change during the key exchange pro-
cedure. The real mobile user is then expected to experience
a quality of service bounded by the worst- and best-case sce-
narios above. In the following, we first describe our proposed
setups and the QKD protocols used in each case, followed by a
description of the channel model.
A. Proposed Setups
We consider four setups in which an indoor wireless user, Alice,
equipped with a QKD-enabled mobile device, would exchange
secret keys with a remote party, Bob, located at the central of-
fice. In order to keep the mobile user’s device simple, we assume
that Alice is only equipped with the QKD encoder. That would
imply that certain QKD schemes, such as entanglement-based
QKD [26], are not suitable for our purpose if they require
measuring single photons at the mobile user’s end. Bob,
however, represents the service-provider node and could be
equipped with the encoder and/or the decoder module as
needed. Based on these assumptions, here we consider several
settings depending on the existence or non-existence of a
trusted/untrusted relay point between the wireless user and
Bob at the central office. In all setups, a data channel will
be wavelength multiplexed with the quantum one to be sent
to the central office. We assume that classical data is being
modulated at a constant rate throughout the QKD operation.
1. Setup 1 with a Trusted Relay Point
Setup 1 is applicable whenever a trusted node between the
sender and the recipient exists. For instance, in an office, we
can physically secure a QKD relay node inside the building
with which the wireless QKD users in the room can exchange
secret keys. In Fig. 2, such a node is located on the ceiling, and
it is comprised of Rx and Tx boxes. In this setup, the secret key
exchange between Alice and Bob is accomplished in two steps: a
secret key, K 1, is generated between Alice and the Rx box in
Fig. 2; also, independently but in parallel, another secure key,
K 2, is exchanged between Tx and the relevant Bob in the cen-
tral office. The final secret key is then obtained by applying an
exclusive-OR (XOR) operation to K 1 and K 2. Note that in this
setup both links are run completely separately; therefore, the
wavelength used in the wireless link does not need to be the
same as the wavelength used in the fiber link. In fact, for
the wireless link, we use 880 nm range of wavelength, for which
efficient and inexpensive single-photon detectors are available.
For the fiber link, conventional telecom wavelengths are used.
DS-BB84 and GG02 protocols will be used for this setup.
2. Setup 2 without a Relay Point
In this setup, we remove the need for having a relay point al-
together. As shown in Fig. 3, the signals transmitted by Alice
are collected by a telescope and coupled to a single-mode fiber
to be sent to the central office. QKD measurements will then
be performed at the central office. Because of this coupling re-
quirement, the wireless signals undergo an additional coupling
loss in setup 2. To reduce the coupling loss, in this setup, and,
for fairness, in all others, we assume that the telescope at the
collection point can focus on the QKD source. This can be
achieved by additional beacon beams and micro-electro-
mechanical based steering mirrors [16]. In order to efficiently
couple this photon to the fiber, the effective field of view (FOV)
at the collection point should match the numerical aperture of a
single-mode fiber. That requires us to use FOVs roughly below
6°, although, in practice, much lower values may be needed. In
this setup, DS-BB84 and GG02 can be suitable protocols and
will be examined in the following sections.
3. Setups 3 and 4 with Untrusted Relay Points
The setups in Figs. 4 and 5 are of interest whenever the indoor
environment that the wireless user is working at is not
Fig. 2. Setup 1, where secret key exchange between Alice and Bob is
achieved in two steps. K 1 is generated between Alice and Rx, while K 2
is generated between Tx and Bob. The resultant key is computed by
taking the XOR of K 1 and K 2. Three cases are examined according to
the position and alignment of the QKD transmitter. The DS-BB84
and GG02 protocols will be examined in this setup. Dynamic beam
steering is used at the Rx node.
Fig. 3. Setup 2, where secret keys are exchanged between Alice and
Bob using the DS-BB84 and GG02 protocols. The latter is only used
in case 3. The QKD signals are collected and coupled to the fiber and
sent to Bob, where the measurement is performed. Dynamic beam
steering is used at the collection node.
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trustworthy. For instance, if the user is working at a public
place, such as a coffee shop or an airport, s/he may not neces-
sarily trust the owners of the local system. In such setups, we
can use the MDI-QKD technique [21] to directly interfere the
quantum signal sent by the users with that of the central office.
This can be accomplished by, if necessary, coupling the wireless
signal into the fiber and performing a Bell-state measurement
(BSM) on the photons sent by Alice and Bob at either the users’
ends (setup 3), or at a certain place located between the sender
and the recipient at the central office (setup 4). In setup 4, we
use the splitting terminal of a PON to implement such BSMs.
Note that in setups 3 and 4 we need to interfere a single-mode
signal traveling in fiber with a photon that has traveled through
the indoor channel. In order to satisfy the BSM indistinguish-
ability criterion, we then need to collect only one spatial mode
from the wireless channel. The flexible beam steering used at
the collection node should then satisfy this requirement.
Here, we use a probabilistic setup for the BSM operation, as
shown in Fig. 6. In this setup, the light coming from the two
users is coupled at a 50∶50 (fiber-based) beam splitter and then
detect the outgoing signals using single-photon detectors. This
simple setup is suitable for time-bin encoding techniques in
QKD, which offer certain advantages in both fiber and free-
space QKD systems. In particular, they may suffer less from
alignment issues as compared to polarization-based encoding
in wireless environments. Note that two successive clicks,
one corresponding to each time bin, are required to have a suc-
cessful BSM. That would require fast single-photon detectors
with sub-nanosecond deadtimes. This is achievable using self-
difference feedback techniques developed recently [27]. If such
detectors are not available, one can rely on one click on each
detector, which roughly corresponds to declaring half of the
success cases.
B. Employed QKD Protocols
We use a number of discrete and continuous-variable QKD
protocols to investigate the performance of the proposed con-
figurations. In the case of DV protocols, we use time-bin en-
coding, in which the information is encoded onto the phase
difference between two successive pulses [28]. We assume that
the gap between the two pulses is sufficiently short that similar
phase distortions would be applied to both time bins while
traversing the channel. Possible discrepancies are modeled by
a relative-phase-error term ed . In the following, we provide a
brief description of QKD protocols considered in this paper.
1. DS-BB84
In the ideal BB84 protocol [11], it is assumed that Alice, the
sender, uses a single-photon source. However, this is not nec-
essarily the case in practice. The actual alternative source is a
highly attenuated laser that produces weak coherent states. The
problem with using such sources is the possibility of experienc-
ing the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [29], as each
pulse might contain more than one photon. That is, Eve
can siphon a photon and forward the rest to Bob. Later, after
public announcement of the bases by Alice and Bob, Eve can
measure exactly the state of the photon without revealing her
presence. The decoy-state technique was proposed to beat this
kind of attack [30]. The idea is to use several different light
intensities, instead of one, so that any attempts by Eve to in-
trude on the link are more likely to be detected [12]. In our
key-rate analysis, we use the efficient version of DS-BB84 [31],
where the Z basis is chosen more frequently than the X basis.
In time-bin encoding, the Z basis is spanned by the single-pho-
ton states corresponding to each time bin, whereas the X ei-
genbases are the superposition of such states. We also assume
that a passive Mach–Zehnder interferometer is used for decod-
ing purposes.
Fig. 4. Setup 3, where secret keys are exchanged between Alice and
Bob using the MDI-QKD protocol. The BSM is performed at the
user’s end in this setup.
Fig. 5. Setup 4, where secret keys are exchanged between Alice and
the central office using the MDI-QKD protocol. The BSM is
performed at the splitting point of the DWDM PON.
Fig. 6. Bell-state measurement (BSM) module used in setups 3 and
4. This module works for time-bin encoded QKD signals. If fast de-
tectors are available, as assumed here, we can do a separate measure-
ment on each time bin. If not, we can still measure one out of four Bell
states by relying on a single click in total on each detector.
490 Vol. 35, No. 3 / March 2018 / Journal of the Optical Society of America B Research Article
2. MDI-QKD
The MDI-QKD protocol provides an efficient method of
removing all detector side-channel attacks [21]. This is done
by performing the measurement by a third party, Charlie,
who is not necessarily trusted. In this protocol, Charlie
performs a BSM on Alice and Bob’s signals, where each have
a DS-BB84 time-bin encoder [32,33]. Here, we again assume
that the efficient version of DS-BB84 is in use. After Charlie
announces the measurement outcomes of the successful events
over a public channel, Alice and Bob follow the typical sifting
and post-processing procedures to come up with a shared
secret key.
3. GG02
While DV-QKD requires single-photon detectors, CV-QKD
protocols are compatible with standard telecommunication
technologies for coherent optical communications, namely,
that of homodyne and heterodyne receivers [34]. CV-QKD
also has, in certain regimes, the possible advantage of being
more resilient to the background noise induced in WDM
networks than DV-QKD [35]. This is due to the intrinsic fil-
tration of photons that do not match the spatio-temporal and
polarization mode of the local oscillator (LO) in homodyne
receivers [23]. However, for secure communication, CV-QKD
may only be practical for short distances in comparison with
DV-QKD [36,37]. This is because of the excess noise and loss
in the optical channels, as well as the limited efficiency of the
classical reconciliation [38].
The GG02 protocol was introduced by Grosshans and
Grangier [22]. It is the counterpart of the BB84 protocol in
the CV preparation and measurement schemes. In contrast
to BB84, which relies on discrete variables such as the polari-
zation of single photons, GG02 exploits the quadratures of
coherent states for encoding the information. In GG02, two
random numbers, X A and PA, are drawn by Alice according
to two independent zero-mean Gaussian distributions with
variance V A in the shot noise unit. The coherent state
jX A  iPAi is then prepared, using amplitude and phase mod-
ulators, by Alice and sent to Bob, who randomly measures one
of the two quadratures. After this stage both users acquire cor-
related random data. The error reconciliation and the privacy
amplification are then performed in order to obtain the final
secure key [22]. Reverse reconciliation [39] is used in our study.
C. Channel Characterization
In this section, we model the two parts of our communication
link, i.e., the wireless and fiber-based components, and find out
how much loss or background noise they may introduce.
1. Indoor Optical Wireless Channel
A wireless QKD system may suffer from two issues. The first is
the existence of background noise caused by the artificial, as
well as natural, sources of light in the room. The second
important issue is the path loss, which can also have a severe
impact on the QKD performance in indoor environments. The
latter is modeled by the channel DC gain, HDC [40,41], which
determines the portion of the transmitted power that will be
detected at the receiver.
In this paper, we follow the same methodology and assump-
tions as presented in our recent work in [13,14] to calculate the
indoor-channel transmittance, HDC, and the corresponding
background noise. In our assumed windowless room, the back-
ground noise induced by the artificial lamp is calculated. That
would depend on the power spectral density (PSD) of the em-
ployed light source. The receiver’s FOV is also important, since
it limits the amount of background noise that may sneak into
the QKD receiver. Here, we account for the reflected light from
the walls and the floor that would be collected at the ceiling.
We use the optical wireless communication (OWC) models in
[40,41] for loss and background noise calculations. For the sake
of brevity, we do not repeat that analysis here, but give some of
the key relationships below.
The DC-gain for a line-of-sight (LOS) link, which here is
used to estimate the channel transmittance, is given by [40]
HDC 

Am1
2πd 2 cosϕmT sψ× gψcosψ 0≤ψ ≤Ψc
0 elsewhere
;
(1)
where d is the distance between the QKD sender and the QKD
node on the ceiling; ψ symbolizes the incidence angle with re-
spect to the receiver axis, whereas ϕ represents the irradiance
angle. Such parameters describe the relative position and ori-
entation between the transmitter and receiver modules. For in-
stance, the orientation in case 3 is modeled by assuming that
the transmitter and receiver axes are identical and the beam
angle is narrow. T sψ is the filter signal transmission; m
and gψ are, respectively, the Lambert’s mode number used
to define the directivity of the source beam and the concentra-
tor gain, which are given by
m  − ln 2
lncosΦ1∕2
(2)
and
gψ 

n2
sin2Ψc 0 ≤ ψ ≤ Ψc
0 ψ > Ψc
: (3)
In Eqs. (1)–(3), Ψc , Φ1∕2, and n are, respectively, the receiv-
er’s FOV, the semi-angle at half-power of the light source, and
the refractive index of the concentrator. Note that the narrower
the FOV, the higher the concentrator gain is. This, of course,
meets certain practical constraints for very low FOVs, which we
try to avoid.
D. Optical Fiber Link
As for the optical link, we make the following assumptions. We
consider a loss coefficient α in decibels per kilometer (dB/km)
in the single-mode fiber. We also assume that the loss contrib-
uted by each multi-port DWDM multiplexer, labeled as AWG
(arrayed waveguide grating) in Figs. 2–5 is Λ in dB. We neglect
the loss associated with two-to-one multiplexers.
As we mentioned earlier, the main source of background
noise in QKD channels in a fiber link is Raman scattering.
The Raman noise generated by a strong classical signal spans
over a wide range of frequencies, and hence can populate the
QKD receivers with unwanted signals [17]. The receivers
can be affected by forward- and backward-scattered light,
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depending on their locations and the direction of light propa-
gation [20]. For a classical signal with intensity I at wavelength
λd , the power of Raman noise at a QKD receiver with band-
width Δλ centered at wavelength λq is given by [17,18]
I fR I ; L; λd ; λq  I e−αLLΓλd ; λqΔλ (4)
for forward scattering and
IbRI ; L; λd ; λq  I
1 − e−2αL
2α
Γλd ; λqΔλ (5)
for backward scattering, where L is the fiber length and
Γλd ; λq is the Raman cross section (per unit of fiber length
and bandwidth), which can be measured experimentally. In our
work, we have used the results reported in [17] for λd 
1550 nm and have used the prescription in [20] to adapt it
to any other wavelengths in the C band. The transmitted power
I is also set to secure a bit error rate (BER) of no more than
10−9 for all data channels. A photodetector would then collect a
total average number of photons, due to forward and backward
scattering, respectively, given by
μfR 
ηd I
f
RλqT d
hc
(6)
and
μbR 
ηd I bRλqT d
hc
; (7)
where T d , ηd , and h represent the detectors’ gate duration, their
quantum efficiency, and Planck’s constant, respectively, with c
being the speed of light in vacuum.
3. KEY-RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, the secret key-rate analysis for our proposed
setups is presented considering non-idealities in the system.
The secret key rate is defined as the asymptotic ratio between
the number of secure bits and sifted bits. Without loss of gen-
erality, we only calculate the rate for user 1 assuming that there
is no eavesdropper present. The DS-BB84 [12] and GG02
protocols are used for setups 1 and 2, while the MDI-QKD
protocol [21,32] is employed for setups 3 and 4.
A. Setups 1 and 2
1. DS-BB84 Protocol
The lower bound for the key generation rate in the limit of an
infinitely long key is given by [12]
R ≥ qf−Qμf hEμ  Q11 − he1g; (8)
where all new parameters are defined in Appendix A. There, we
show that the expected value for these parameters in our loss-
and background-induced model for the channel mainly
depends on two parameters: the overall efficiency of each link
η and the total background noise per detector, denoted by nN.
Here, nN accounts for both dark counts and background noise
in the link. In the following, we specify how these parameters
can be calculated in each setup.
In setup 1, we have two links: a wireless link and a wired
link. Below, the parameter values for each link will be calculated
separately.
Setup 1, wireless link: For the wireless channel, we assume
that the background noise due to the artificial lighting source is
denoted by nB1, which can be calculated using the methodology
proposed in [13]. In our calculations, we upper-bound nB1 by
considering the case where the QKD receiver is focused on the
center of the room. The total noise per detector, nN , is then
given by
nN  nB1ηd 1∕2 ndc; (9)
where ηd 1 is the detector efficiency for the detector in the Rx
box, and ndc is the dark-count rate per pulse for each detector in
the Rx box in Fig. 2. We neglect the impact of the ambient
noise in our windowless room [13]. The total transmissivity
is also given by η  HDCηd 1∕2. The factor 1/2 represents
the loss in the passive time-bin decoder consisting of a
Mach–Zehnder interferometer.
Setup 1, fiber link: As for the fiber-based link, the back-
ground noise is mainly induced by the Raman-scattered light.
In this setup, where Bob’s receiver is at the central office,
forward-scattered light is generated because of the classical sig-
nals sent by the users, and backward-scattered light is due to the
signals sent by the central office. The total powers of Raman
noise, at wavelength λq1 , for forward and backward scattering
are, respectively, given by
I fT 1 

I fR I ; L0  L1; λd 1 ; λq1

XN
k2
I fR I e−αLk ; L0; λdk ; λq1

10−2Λ∕10 (10)
and
I bT 1

IbRI ;L0L1;λd 1 ;λq1
XN
k2
I bRI ;L0;λdk ;λq1

10−2Λ∕10;
(11)
where L0 is the total distance between the central office and the
AWG box at the users’ splitting point and Lk is the distance of
the kth user to the same AWG in the access network. In the
above equations, we have neglected the out-of-band Raman
noise that will be filtered by relevant multiplexers in our setup.
For instance, in calculating I fT 1, we account for the effect of the
forward Raman noise by the data signal generated by user 1
over a total distance of L0  L1, but a similar effect by other
users is only accounted for over a distance L0. That is because
the AWG box filters most of the Raman noise at λq1 generated
over distances Lk, and their effect can be neglected. By substi-
tuting the above equations in Eqs. (6) and (7), the total back-
ground noise per detector at Bob’s end in Fig. 2 is given by
nN 
ηd 2λq1T d
2hc
I fT 1  I bT 1  ndc; (12)
where ηd2 is the detector efficiency at Bob’s receiver. Note that
in setup 1 we consider two different values for ηd 1 and ηd 2 . The
reason is that the former corresponds to the available silicon
avalanche photodiode (APD) single-photon detectors at
880 nm, while the latter could be for InGaAs APD single-
photon detectors within the 1550-nm band.
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The total transmissivity η for the fiber link is given by
ηfibηd 2∕2, where ηfib is the optical fiber channel transmittance
including the loss associated with AWGs given by
ηfib  10−αL1L02Λ∕10: (13)
Setup 2: In setup 2, the total Raman noise powers for for-
ward and backward scattering, denoted by I fT 2 and I
b
T 2, are
given by I fT 1 and I
b
T 1, respectively. The total background noise
per detector at Bob’s end in Fig. 3 is then given by
nN 
ηd 2
2

λq1T d
hc
I fT 2  I bT 2  nB1ηfibηcoup

 ndc; (14)
where ηcoup is the additional air-to-fiber coupling loss that the
indoor background photons, generated by the bulb, will expe-
rience before reaching the QKD receiver. The total channel
transmittance between the sender and the recipient in this
setup is given by η  HDCηcoupηfibηd2∕2.
2. GG02 Protocol
The secure key rate for GG02 with reverse reconciliation under
collective attacks is given by [42]
K  βIAB − χBE ; (15)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency. IAB and χBE are, respec-
tively, the mutual information between Alice and Bob and the
amount of information obtained by the adversary in reverse
reconciliation. More details can be found in Appendix B.
GG02 is characterized by the channel transmissivity ηch and
the excess noise ε. For estimating the latter, we need to consider
the contribution of the bulb, εb, as well as the Raman scatter-
ing, εr . The total excess noise, ε, is then given by εb  εr  εq,
where εq is any other additional noise observed in the experi-
ment. In the Appendix B formulation, the excess noise terms
must be calculated at the input. For chaotic sources of light, if
the average noise count at the end of a channel with transmis-
sivity ηt is given by n, the corresponding excess noise at the
input would be given by 2n∕ηt [35,43]. Below, we use this
expression to calculate εb and εr , assuming that both the
Raman noise and the bulb-induced background noise are of
chaotic-light nature.
Setup 1, wireless link: In setup 1, the background noise
due to the bulb is denoted by nB1. This is the total background
noise at the Rx box input. Given that the LO would pick a
single spatio-temporal mode with matching polarization, the
corresponding count that sneaks into the homodyne receiver
would be nB1∕2. The corresponding excess noise would then
be given by εb  nB1∕HDC and ε  εb  εq. In this case,
ηch  HDC. In an experiment, εq is often calculated by meas-
uring the corresponding parameter, εrecq , at the receiver. In this
case, εq  εrecq ∕ηchηB, where ηB is Bob’s receiver’s overall
efficiency.
Setup 1, fiber link: In this case, ηch  ηfib, εb  0, and
εr  nr∕ηch, where
nr 
λq1T d
hc
I fT 1  I bT 1: (16)
Setup 2: In setup 2, ηch  HDCηcoupηfib, εb  nB1∕HDC,
and εr  nr∕ηch, where
nr 
λq1T d
hc
I fT 2  I bT 2: (17)
In all CV-QKD setups, we assume that a phase reference for
the LO is available at the receiver.
B. Setups 3 and 4 with MDI-QKD Protocol
The secret key rate for the MDI-QKD setup is given in
Appendix C. The key parameters to find for this scheme are
ηa and ηb, which, respectively, correspond to the total transmis-
sivity seen by Alice and Bob’s channels, as well as nN , which is
the total background noise per detector. Here we find these
parameters for setups 3 and 4.
Setup 3: The total forward and backward Raman noise
powers for setup 3 at wavelength λq1 are, respectively, given by
I fT 3 

I fR I ; L0  L1; λd 1 ; λq1
e−αL1
XN
k2
I fR I ; L0; λdk ; λq1

10−2Λ∕10;
I bT 3 

I bRI ; L0  L1; λd 1 ; λq1
e−αL1
XN
k2
IbRI e−αLk ; L0; λdk ; λq1

10−2Λ∕10: (18)
The total noise per detector, nN , for setup 3 is then given by
nN 
ηd 2
4

λq1T d
hc
I fT 3  I bT 3  nB1ηcoup

 ndc; (19)
where we account for one particular polarization entering the
BSM module.
In setup 3, ηa  HDCηd2ηcoup∕2 and ηb  ηd2ηfib∕2,
assuming an average loss factor of 1/2 for polarization mis-
match. Note that the two modes interfering at the BSM must
have matching polarizations. This can be achieved passively by
using polarization filters before the 50∶50 beam splitter in the
BSM, in which case, an average loss of 1/2 is expected, or,
alternatively, we need to use an active polarization stabilizer,
for which the corresponding loss factor approaches 1.
Setup 4: The total forward and backward Raman noise
powers for setup 4 at wavelength λq1 are, respectively, given by
I fT 4 

I fR I ; L0; λd 1 ; λq1 
XN
k2
I fR I ; L0; λdk ; λq1

× 10−2Λ∕10  I fR I ; L1; λd 1 ; λq1;
I bT 4 

IbRI e−αL1 ; L0; λd 1 ; λq1

XN
k2
I bRIe−αLk ; L0; λdk ; λq1
 IbRI e−αL0 ; L1; λd 1 ; λq1

10−2Λ∕10: (20)
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The total noise per detector, nN , for setup 4 is as follows:
nN 
ηd 2
4

λq1T d
hc
I fT 4  I bT 4  nB1ηcoup10−αL1∕10

 ndc:
(21)
In setup 4, ηa  HDCηd 2ηcoup10−αL1∕10∕2 and
ηb  ηd 210−αL02Λ∕10∕2.
4. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide some numerical results for secret key
rates in the four proposed setups. We use a DWDM scheme
with 100-GHz channel spacing in the C band with 32 users.
We define Q  f1530.8 nm; 1531.6 nm;…; 1555.62 nmg
and D  f1560.4 nm; 1561.2 nm;…; 1585.2 nmg for quan-
tum and classical channels, respectively. We assume that λq1
is 1555.62 nm and the corresponding λd 1 is 1585.2 nm. The
classical data is transmitted with launch power I 
10−3.85αL∕102Λ∕10 mW, which corresponds to receiver sensi-
tivity of −38.5 dB, guaranteeing a BER of 10−9 [20]. In all set-
ups, we assume that L1  L2      LN all equal to 500 m.
Other nominal parameter values used in our simulation are
summarized in Table 1. These are based on values that are tech-
nologically available today. In particular, for DV-QKD systems,
we assume silicon-based single-photon detectors are used in the
800-nm regime (setup 1, indoor channel), whereas GaAs de-
tectors may need to be used in the 1550-nm regime (all other
setups). The former often have higher quantum efficiencies
than the latter. That is why in our numerical parameters,
ηd1 is twice as big as ηd2. The dark-count rate in such detectors
varies from (100–1000)/s for an APD, to (1–100)/s for super-
conducting detectors [44]. The average dark-count rate consid-
ered here is 1000/s, which, over a period of 100 ps, will result in
ndc  10−7. In the CV-QKD system, ηB is Bob’s receiver’s
overall efficiency, which includes detector efficiencies and
any insertion loss in the homodyne receiver. The parameter
β is the efficiency of our post-processing, which nowadays ex-
ceeds 95% [45]. The parameter values chosen for the receiver
electronic noise and excess noise correspond to the observed
values in recent CV-QKD experiments [37]. Based on the val-
ues chosen for our system parameters, relevant parameters in
Section 3, such as ηfib and ηch, can be calculated from which
parameter η for each setup is obtained. The noise parameter nN ,
for each setup, can similarly be found. The Raman noise terms,
in particular, have been calculated by extracting the Raman
cross section from the experimental measurements reported
in [17]. Note that in our numerical calculations we often vary
the coupling loss to study system performance.
In each setup, three cases are considered for the light-beam
orientation of the QKD source. In the first case, the semi-angle
at half-power of the QKD source is Φ1∕2  20°, while the
QKD source is placed at the center of the room’s floor.
With the same Φ1∕2, the QKD source is moved to the corner
of the room in the second case. We use Φ1∕2  1° in the third
case, where the QKD source is located at the corner of the room
as in the second case, but the beam is directed and focused
toward the QKD receiver or the collection element. A full
alignment is assumed in the third case, while in the other
two cases the QKD source is sending light upward to the ceiling
with a wider beam angle. As for the receiver, we assume that its
telescope is dynamically rotating to collect the maximum power
from the user in the three cases. We assume that the effective
receiver’s FOV would correspond to the numerical aperture
(NA) of a single-mode fiber. For single-mode fibers, NA is
about 0.1, which means that the corresponding FOV that
can be coupled to the fiber is around 6°. Here, the QKD receiv-
er’s FOV is assumed to be 6° in order to maximize the
collected power.
The first thing we study here is whether the loose alignment
in cases 1 and 2 would be sufficient for the proper operation of
a networked wireless link. The short answer turns out to be
negative for setups 2–4. We already know the result for setup
1 from the previous work in [13], in which the authors show
that if the only source of lighting in the room is an LED bulb
with a PSD on the order of 10−5–10−6 W∕nm, then there will
be regions over which even in cases 1 and 2 the wireless user can
exchange secret keys with the Rx box. This seems to no longer
necessarily hold if we remove the trusted relay node in the
room. In Fig. 7, we have plotted the secret key rate versus
the coupling loss for setups 2 to 4. While for a user in the center
of the room it may be marginally possible to exchange keys at
PSD  10−7 W∕nm, once the user moves to the corner, the
required PSD drops to 10−8 W∕nm. This is not strange, as
in setups 2–4 we have more loss and additional sources of noise
as compared to setup 1. The required parameter values may
not, however, be achievable in practical settings, and that
implies that dynamic beam steering may be needed at both
the transmitter and the receiver side of a wireless QKD link.
There are several other observations that can be made from
Fig. 7. We have verified that the MDI-QKD with DS has a
rather poor performance, and in order to tolerate substantial
Table 1. Nominal Values Used for Our System
Parameters
System Parameters Nominal Value
Number of users, N 32
Fiber attenuation coefficient, α 0.2 dB/km
AWG insertion loss, Λ 2 dB
Room size, X , Y , Z (4 × 4 × 3) m3
Semi-angle at half-power of the bulb 70°
Reflection coefficients of the walls and floor 0.7
Detector area 1 cm2
Refractive index of the concentrator 1.5°
Semi-angle at half-power of QKD source, Φ1∕2 20°, 1°
DV-QKD Parameters Nominal Value
Average number of photons per signal pulse, μ  ν 0.5
Error correction inefficiency, f 1.16
Dark count per pulse, ndc 10−7
Detector gate width, T d 100 ps
Relative-phase error probability, ed 0.033
Quantum efficiency of detector, ηd1, at 880 nm 0.6
Quantum efficiency of detector, ηd2, at 1550 nm 0.3
CV-QKD Parameters Nominal Value
Reconciliation efficiency, β 0.95
Receiver overall efficiency, ηB 0.6
Electronic noise (shot noise units), velec 0.015
Excess noise (shot noise units), εrecq 0.002
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coupling loss, we need to use nearly ideal single-photon
sources. It can also be seen that the performance of setups 3
and 4 are more or less the same. As expected, moving the
BSM module around does not make a big difference in the
key rate. Setup 3 has slightly better performance for the param-
eter values chosen here, partly because setup 4 might have
slightly more Raman noise, as will be shown later. But, overall,
if one needs to go with a trust-free relay node, its position can
be decided based on the operational convenience without
sacrificing much of the performance. In forthcoming graphs,
we then only present the results for setup 3.
The situation is much more optimistic if full alignment,
with Φ1∕2  1°, between the wireless QKD receiver and trans-
mitter is attained (case 3). In this case, the QKD source is lo-
cated at a corner of the room and transmits directly to the QKD
receiver or the collector. The full alignment for this narrow
beam would highly improve the channel transmissivity.
Figure 8(a) shows key rate versus coupling loss at a PSD of
10−5 W∕nm. It can be seen that coupling loss as high as
40 dB can be tolerated in certain setups. That leaves a large
budget for loss in different elements of the system. As compared
to Fig. 7, the rate has also improved by around three orders of
magnitude. For a fixed coupling loss of 10 dB, Fig. 8(b) shows
how the remaining loss budget can be used to reach farther
central offices. It seems that tens of kilometers are reachable
with practical decoy-state signals in all setups. In this figure,
we have also shown the total key rate for setup 1, which
can serve as a benchmark for other setups. For a repetition rate
of 1 GHz, keys can be exchanged at a total rate ranging from
kilobits per second (kbps) to megabits per second (Mbps) at
moderate distances.
There are additional interesting, but somehow puzzling,
points in Fig. 8. For instance, in Fig. 8(a), the MDI-QKD
curve with DS implies that no secret keys can be exchanged
at low coupling losses. This is counterintuitive. Yet, we have
verified that the same behavior is seen in asymmetric MDI-
QKD systems, when one user’s—let us say Alice’s—signal is
accompanied by background noise. Such a background noise
would therefore undergo the same amount of loss as Alice’s sig-
nal. In a particular regime, where the background noise is com-
parable to Bob’s rate of photon arrival at the BSMmodule, such
background photons could masquerade Bob’s photons and
cause errors. In setup 3, the background noise that accompanies
Alice’s signal is that of the bulb noise. If we make the coupling
loss very low, such a noise would easily get into our BSM mod-
ule and could cause errors. This explains the strange behavior of
the MDI-QKD curve in Fig. 8(a). Another detailed point is in
Fig. 8(b), in which the maximum security distance for setup 2,
with 10 dB of coupling loss, is 60 km. In that case, one may
expect that the security distance for setup 1, with no coupling
loss, should be 50 km (corresponding to 10 dB of fiber loss)
longer, i.e., 110 km. The difference is, however, around 30 km.
This turns out to be because of the additional Raman noise at
longer distances. In order to understand this and the previous
observation better, we need to explore the noise characteristic of
the system, as we do next.
In Fig. 9, we have plotted the noise counts per detector
due to (a) forward Raman scattering (FRS), (b) backward
Raman scattering (BRS), (c) the lighting source bulb, and
(d) the total background noise nN for each setup. In each setup,
the (a)–(c) noise components have been obtained from the
Fig. 7. Secret key rate per pulse versus the coupling loss, ηcoup, in
decibels (dB), in setups 2, 3, and 4 in cases 1 and 2. The QKD source
is placed at the center of the room in case 1, while it is moved to a
corner of the room in case 2, with semi-angle at half-power of Φ1∕2 
20° in both cases. Receiver’s FOV is 6°. The decoy-state and MDI-
QKD protocols are used for secret key-rate analysis. The bulb’s
PSD in cases 1 and 2 is 10−7 W∕nm and 10−8 W∕nm, respectively.
The fiber length (L0) is 10 km. (DS, decoy state; SPP, single-photon
pulse.)
(a) (b)
Fig. 8. Secret key rate for setups 1–3 in case 3, in which the full
alignment between the QKD node on the ceiling and wireless trans-
mitter is obtained. The QKD source is placed at a corner of the room’s
floor, with semi-angle at half-power Φ1∕2  1°. Receiver’s FOV is 6°.
(a) The secret key rate per pulse versus the coupling loss, ηcoup, in dB.
Fiber length is L0  10 km and PSD is 10−5 W∕nm. (b) The total
secret key rate in bits per second (bps) versus L0 when the coupling loss
is 10 dB, PSD is 10−5 W∕nm, and the repetition rate is 1 GHz. (DS,
decoy state; SPP, single-photon pulse.)
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 9. Noise counts per detector due to (a) forward Raman scatter-
ing, (b) backward Raman scattering, (c) the artificial lighting source,
and (d) the total background noise nN , all in count per pulse (c/p),
versus L0. The bulb’s PSD is 10−5 W∕nm and ηcoup is 10 dB.
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corresponding expression for nN by breaking it into its indi-
vidual terms. There are several observations to be made.
In terms of order of magnitude, all three sources of noise in
Figs. 9(a)–9(c) are larger or comparable to dark-count noise
per pulse, where the latter in our setup is 10−7∕pulse. This
proves the relevance of our analysis that accounts for Raman
and background noises. In Fig. 9(a), the FRS in setup 4 has
a surprising rise at long distances. This is because of the
launch-power control scheme in use, which requires the data
transmitters to send a larger amount of power proportional
to the channel loss. At a short fixed L1, this additional power
creates additional FRS in setup 4. The effect of FRS is, however,
negligible when compared to BRS, which is roughly 2 orders of
magnitude higher than FRS. BRS increases with fiber length
because of the power control scheme, and will be the major
source of noise in long distances. This increase in BRS justifies
the shorter-than-expected security distances in Fig. 8(b). Finally,
it can be seen why MDI-QKD setups are more vulnerable to
bulb noise than the DS system of setup 2. The bulb noise would
enter the BSMmodule in setups 3 and 4 by mainly being attenu-
ated by the coupling loss, whereas in setup 2, it will be further
attenuated by the channel loss. That is partly why the rate in
setup 2 can be higher than that of setups 3 and 4. Based on these
results, one can conclude that, if the MDI property is not a
crucial design factor, setup 2 could offer a reasonable practical
solution to the scenarios where a trusted relay is not available.
In the rest of this section, we will then compare the performance
of different protocols that can be run in setup 2.
Figure 10 compares the GG02 performance in setups 1 and
2 with DS-BB84. In Fig. 10(a) we study the resilience of either
scheme against background noise at low values of coupling loss.
As has been shown for fiber-based systems [35], CV-QKD can
tolerate a higher amount of background noise in this regime
due to the intrinsic filtering properties of its local oscillator.
That benefit would, however, go away if the coupling loss
roughly exceeds 10 dB in our case; see Fig. 10(b). This implies
that full beam steering is definitely a must when it comes to
CV-QKD. Depending on the setting of the system, the
operator can decide whether a DV or a CV scheme is the better
option.
Figure 11 shows the relevant regimes of operation for DV
and CV-QKD schemes in a different way. In Fig. 11(a), we
have looked at the maximum coupling loss tolerated by each
of the two schemes for a given background noise. It is clear
that while for low values of coupling loss, CV-QKD can
tolerate more noise, at high values of coupling loss DV-QKD
is the only option, although it can tolerate less noise. There is
therefore a trade-off between the amount of coupling loss ver-
sus background noise the system can tolerate. In Fig. 11(b), we
have compared the two systems from the clock rate point
of view. CV-QKD is often practically constrained by its low
repetition rate. In Fig. 11(b), we have fixed the CV repetition
rate to 25 MHz [46] and have found out at what clock rate the
DV system offers a higher total key rate than the CV one. For
numerical values used in our simulation, this cross-over rate is
around 200 MHz, which is achievable for today’s DV-QKD
systems. The ultimate choice between DV and CV would then
depend on the characteristics of the system, such as loss and
noise levels, as well as the clock rate available to the QKD
system.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed and studied four configurations that enabled
wireless access to hybrid quantum-classical networks. All these
setups included an initial wireless indoor link that connected a
quantum user to the network. Each user in the access network
could also communicate classically with the central office via
another wavelength in the same band. We considered setups
in which a local relay point could be trusted as well as setups
where such trust was not required. We showed that with proper
beam alignment it was possible, in both DV- and CV-QKD, to
achieve positive key rates for both trusted and untrusted relay
points in certain indoor environments.
The choice of the optimum setup would depend on various
system parameters, which we studied in our analysis. For in-
stance, we found that our MDI-QKD setups, which offered
(a) (b)
Fig. 10. Comparison of the GG02 and DS-BB84 protocols for
setup 2 and case 3 [except for the curve labeled GG02 (setup 1)].
(a) Secret key rate per pulse versus total background noise. The latter
is assumed to be per detector for DV-QKD, while it is per spatio-
temporal mode for CV-QKD. (b) Secret key rate per pulse versus cou-
pling loss, ηcoup, in dB. The coupling loss in (a) is 5 dB for setup 2 and
0 dB for setup 1. The shared fiber length (L0) is 10 km. The used
bulb’s PSD is 10−5 W∕nm.
(a) (b)
Fig. 11. (a) Regions of secure operation for DV-QKD (DS-BB84)
and CV-QKD (GG02) protocols for setup 2 (case 3). The curves show
the maximum tolerable background noise at different values of cou-
pling loss, ηcoup, in dB. The background noise is calculated per detec-
tor for DV-QKD, while it is per spatio-temporal mode for CV-QKD.
(b) Comparison of the two systems from the clock rate point of view
when the CV repetition rate is fixed to 25 MHz. In (a) and (b),
L0  10 km. In (b), coupling loss is 5 dB and PSD is 10−5 W∕nm.
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trust-free QKD immune to measurement attacks, were mostly
insensitive to the positions of their measurement modules, but
could suffer harshly from the background noise generated in
the indoor environment. If immunity to measurement attacks
was not required, we could simply collect QKD signals at the
ceiling and couple them into optical fibers along with other
data channels. With decoy-state techniques, we showed that
we could tolerate up to 30 dB of coupling loss in such a setting,
provided that full alignment is achieved. At long distances, the
Raman noise induced by the data channels would also take its
toll on the maximum secure distance, limiting it to tens of kilo-
meters. Both Raman noise and the background noise due to the
artificial light source in the indoor environment could be orders
of magnitude larger than the static dark count of single-photon
detectors. We also showed that in the low-coupling-loss regime,
CV-QKD could offer higher rates and more resilience to back-
ground noise than DV-QKD systems. But, overall, DV-QKD
schemes could offer a more stable and flexible operation adapt-
able to a wider range of scenarios. In short, using our analytical
results, we can identify the winner in realistic setups that enable
high-rate wireless access to future quantum networks.
APPENDIX A: DS-BB84 KEY-RATE ANALYSIS
In this appendix, the secret key generation rate of the DS-BB84
protocol is calculated. The lower bound for the key rate, in the
limit of an infinitely long key, is given by [12]
R ≥ qf−Qμf hEμ  Q11 − he1g; (A1)
where q is the basis-sift factor, which is assumed to approach 1
in the efficient BB84 protocol [31] as employed in this work.
The error-correction inefficiency is denoted by f > 1, and μ is
the average number of photons per signal pulse. Moreover, in
Eq. (A1), Qμ, Eμ, Q1, e1, and hx are, respectively, the overall
gain, the quantum bit error rate (QBER), the single-photon
gain, the error rate in single-photon states, and the Shannon
binary entropy function. In the case of a lossy channel with
a total transmissivity of η and a total background noise per
detector of nN , the above parameters are given by [47]
Qμ  1 − e−ημ1 − nN 2;
Eμ 
e0Qμ − e0 − ed 1 − e−ημ1 − nN 
Qμ
;
Q1  Y 1μe−μ; e1 
e0Y 1 − e0 − ed η1 − nN 
Y 1
; (A2)
where e0  1∕2 and
Y 1  1 − 1 − η1 − nN 2;
hx  −x log2 x − 1 − xlog21 − x; (A3)
where we assume that there has been no eavesdropping activity
in the channel. This is considered to be the normal operating
mode of the system, and the key rate calculated under the above
conditions would give us a sense of what we may expect from
our QKD system in practice. The same assumptions have been
used to calculate the key rate of other protocols, as we see next.
APPENDIX B: GG02 KEY-RATE ANALYSIS
The secret key rate for GG02 with reverse reconciliation, under
collective attacks, is given by [42]
K  βIAB − χBE ; (B1)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, and IAB is the mutual
information between Alice and Bob, which, for a Gaussian
channel, is given by
IAB 
1
2
log2
V  χtot
1 χtot
; (B2)
where V and χtot are, respectively, the total variance and the
total noise given by
V  V A  1; (B3)
with V A being the variance of Alice’s quadrature modulation
and
χtot  χ line  χhom∕ηch; (B4)
in which
χ line 
1 − ηch
ηch
 ε; χhom 
1 − ηB
ηB
 velec
ηB
; (B5)
are, respectively, the noise due to the channel and the noise
stemming from homodyne detection. Also, the parameters
ηB , velec, ε, and ηch, are, respectively, Bob’s overall efficiency,
electronic noise variance induced by homodyne electronic
board, excess noise, and the channel transmittance. In Eq. (B1),
χBE is the Holevo information between Eve and Bob, and it is
given by
χBE  gΛ1  gΛ2 − gΛ3 − gΛ4; (B6)
where
gx 

x  1
2

log2

x  1
2

−

x − 1
2

log2

x − 1
2

;
(B7)
with
Λ1∕2 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
A	
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
A2 − 4B
p 	
∕2
r
;
Λ3∕4 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C 	
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
C2 − 4D
p 	
∕2
r
: (B8)
In the above equations,
A  V 21 − 2ηch  2ηch  η2chV  χ line2;
B  η2chV χ line  12;
C  V
ﬃﬃﬃ
B
p  ηchV  χ line  Aχhom
ηchV  χtot
;
D 
ﬃﬃﬃ
B
p V  ﬃﬃﬃBp χhom
ηchV  χtot
: (B9)
APPENDIX C: MDI-QKD KEY-RATE ANALYSIS
In this appendix, we summarize the secret key rate of the MDI-
QKD protocol. The rates for the ideal single-photon source and
the decoy-state protocols, respectively, are
Research Article Vol. 35, No. 3 / March 2018 / Journal of the Optical Society of America B 497
RSPPMDI-QKD  Y 111 − he11:X  − f he11:Z  (C1)
and
RDSMDI-QKD  Q111 − he11;X  − f Qμν;Z hEμν;Z : (C2)
In the above, Q11 is the gain of the single-photon states
given by
Q11  μνe−μ−νY 11; (C3)
where μ (ν) is the mean number of photons in the signal state
sent by Alice (Bob) and Y 11 is the yield of the single-photon
states given by
Y 11  1 − nN 2ηaηb∕2
 2ηa  2ηb − 3ηaηbnN41 − ηa1 − ηbn2N ;
(C4)
where nN represents the total noise per detector and ηa and ηb
are, respectively, the total transmittance between Alice and
Bob’s sides and that of Charlie [47]. In Eqs. (C1) and (C2),
e11;Z , e11;X , Qμν;Z , and Eμν;Z , respectively, represent the
QBER in the Z basis for single-photon states, the phase error
for single-photon states, the overall gain, and the QBER in the
Z basis, which are given by [47]
e11;X Y 11  Y 11∕2 − 1∕2 − ed 1 − nN 2ηaηb∕2;
e11;ZY 11  Y 11∕2 − 1∕2 − ed 1 − nN 21 − 2nN ηaηb∕2;
Qμν;Z  QC  QE; Eμν;ZQμν;Z  edQc  1 − ed QE;
(C5)
where
QC  21 − nN 2e−μ 0∕21 − 1 − nN e−ηaμ∕2
× 1 − 1 − nN e−ηbν∕2QE
 2nN 1 − nN 2e−μ 0∕2I 02x − 1 − nN e−μ 0∕2; (C6)
with x  ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃηaμηbνp ∕2, μ 0  ηaμ ηbν and I 0 being the modi-
fied Bessel function.
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